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I test the hypothesis that unemployment experienced in high unemployment regions is less likely to
be viewed by employers as a negative productivity signal, and more as a characteristic of the region.
This predicts that unemployment's short-run negative wage eects will be mitigated if experienced
in high unemployment regions. If so, then what long-term implications does this have for future
wage growth (Wage Scarring)? How important is regional heterogeneity in driving wage outcomes?
Continuous work-life histories are matched to the regional context in which individuals reside. This
novel data set permits control for the timing of career disruptions, as well as regional location at
the time of displacement, whilst searching and at re-employment. Persistent wage penalties are
found, conditional on previous labour market status. Seminal UK research concludes that the rst
spell of non-employment carries the highest penalty. Considering unemployment and inactivity, no
reduction in the penalty associated with incidence of inactivity is found. Strong regional dierences
are found in the impact of redundancy on wage growth. This is contingent on labour market tight-
ness and urbanity of the region in which unemployment was experienced. Redundancy followed by
unemployment in areas of high economic activity is equally damaging for future earnings potential,
independent of age. Moreover, robust evidence is found supporting the main hypothesis in the UK,
on average and for over 45s made redundant in their previous jobs.
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Economists have had a long standing interest in the impact of unemployment on individuals' labour
market outcomes. Whilst extensive work has been conducted on the persistence of unemployment,
less exists on the long-term implications for future earnings trajectories. Wage Scarring refers to the
long-term impact of individual unemployment experience(s), hypothesised to increase the likelihood of
future unemployment and decreasing future earnings potential. Economic theory provides ambiguous
predictions with respect to this question. Job loss, and subsequent unemployment, may be linked
to wage scarring through various mechanisms. There may be stigma eects of unemployment (since
productivity is imperfectly observed, unemployment may be viewed as a negative productivity signal
by prospective employers) which feed into lower wage oers. Firm-specic human capital is lost when
a job is terminated, implying that, if returns to specic human capital are shared between the rm
and worker(s) and human capital accrues with tenure on the job, longer tenure workers are at risk of
losing the most due to job loss if this human capital is not transferable across employers. Independent
of whether returns to specic capital are shared, rms have less incentive to layo high tenure workers
than their low tenure counterparts. Whilst there are many potential mechanisms at work, with some
operating in dierent directions, human capital theory provides a tractable framework in which to
operate as well as generating testable predictions (Becker, 1962).
Individuals may quit their job, or be red due to low productivity. To avoid this selection issue
the literature has tended to focus on the impact of employer initiated job displacement, that can be
reasonably assumed to be unrelated to a worker's characteristics. This approach is taken in order to
approximate a natural experiment. A direct test of human capital theory is that displaced workers earn
less on the post- than pre-displacement jobs (Farber, 1999), the rst generation of papers investigated
short-term implications conducting before and after comparative studies on North American data.
Addison and Portugal (1989) and Houle and van Audenrode (1995) are examples of before and after
studies employing Displaced Worker Surveys for the US and Canada respectively. Looking at longer-
term viewpoint, Jacobson et al. (1993) employed Pennsylvanian administrative data, whilst Ruhm
(1991) drew on the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Results for the more 
exible labour
markets of the UK and US have found substantial and persistent earnings losses which remain to
the order of 10% to 18% even 10 years after re-employment (Ruhm, 1991; Jacobson et al., 1993;
Gregory and Jukes, 2001; Arulampalam, 2001), whereas the evidence in Europe is less marked (Kunze,
2002). More recent contributions to the debate have replicated the approach of Jacobson et al.
(1993), implementing newly developed econometric techniques (propensity-score matching) to extend
the analysis, using administrative data for the United Kingdom (Hijzen et al., 2010), Sweden (Eliason
and Storrie, 2006) and the US state of Connecticut (Couch and Placzek, 2010). Eliason and Storrie
(2006) highlight the increased sensitivity of displaced workers' earnings losses to recessionary pressures.
Furthermore, Couch and Placzek (2010) cast doubt over the generalisability of JLS's results for the US
as a whole, given changes in State and time period. The existing literature suggests that variation in
1institutional context may help to explain cross-country dierences in the impact of unemployment on
wage growth. However, Gangl (2006) nds that enough institutional heterogeneity exists to generate
marked dierences in wage scarring across EU members.
Although institutions may vary across countries, there is generally not enough variation in institu-
tional context within a country to generate the observed dierences in wage outcomes across regions
(Carrington, 1993)1. van Dijk and Folmer (1999) hypothesize, and provide cross-sectional evidence,
that longer unemployment periods carry a signicant negative productivity signal in regions with
low unemployment rates whereas in periphery regions where unemployment rates are high, this is
attributed to the characteristics of the regional labour market This raises the question of whether
this hypothesis holds when applied to Great Britain in a dynamic longitudinal context. Given the
interconnectedness of Britain's regions, it is puzzling why persistent dierences in average regional
earnings remain. This analysis may shed some light on the cause of these regional dierences. Do the
substantial and persistent earnings losses found by UK studies like Arulampalam (2001) remain when
adding the extra waves now available in the BHPS, and how important is regional heterogeneity?
In order to address these questions, the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) is used to construct
continuous work-life histories, following individuals from when they rst left full-time education. In
constructing the dataset, a rules-based approach is adopted to minimise measurement error and ensure
consistency of the data. Individuals' labour market histories are prone to overlap due to the timing
of interviews in the BHPS varying over the period of the survey (Halpin, 1997; Upward, 1999; Paull,
2002; Mar e, 2006). Retrospective lifetime histories are constructed, spanning the period since rst
leaving full-time education. This information allows for a direct measure of general labour market
experience, rather than using a potential experience proxy, thus reducing measurement error. The
analysis uses interview dates as reference points due to better data coverage at these intervals, as well
as being integral to the rules-based approach adopted. This dataset is linked to the Labour Force
Survey at the Travel-to-Work Area & Local Authority levels of aggregation in order to incorporate
time-varying unobserved heterogeneity not adequately captured in the model, as well as to address
the research question. For more information on the dataset construction please consult Ball (2010).
The paper is organised as follows. Selected contributions to the existing literature are summarised
in the Appendix, Table 13. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 describes the methodology in the
context of the exisiting literature. Section 4 examines descriptive statistics relating to the consequences
of job displacement for future wage growth. Section 5 presents results from an initial replication of
Arulampalam (2001). Section 6 extends the basic results in terms of observation period and regional-
level eects. Sensitivity checks are brie
y detailed in section 7, whilst Section 8 concludes.
1Federal countries are a notable exception, however the extent to which this impacts on observed wage outcomes
across regions is an empirical question.
22 The Data
The British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) Detailed individual-level information is sourced
from the BHPS. The version of the BHPS used in this study covers 11 waves of the survey, from
1991-2001. Unfortunately data coverage over the full survey period, 1991-2008, is incomplete for a
key indicator at the sub-regional level. `Labour market tightness' is commonly proxied by the va-
cancy/unemployment ratio, key to the Matching literature. The vacancies series is available from
NOMIS (www.nomisweb.co.uk) at the sub-regional level. Vacancy statistics are likely to suer severe
downward bias due to the fact that vacancy posting is not obligatory for rms (Folmer and van Dijk,
1988). The existence of internal labour markets, implies that vacancy statistics will tend to under-
estimate the true level of labour demand as rms may recruit internally as a rst option (Atkinson
and Micklewright, 1991). In addition to being plagued by data quality issues, there is a one year
gap the series due to signicant changes to Jobcentre Plus procedures for handling vacancies in 2001.
Moreover, the eect of this change was that vacancy statistics are not comparable over time (Bentley,
2005). The extended time-frame under investigation was reduced from 1991-2008 (for which data
was available at the time of writing) to 1991-2001 in order to account for this issue. Socio-Economic
data available in the BHPS at the individual & household level. The survey provides an annual na-
tionally representative sample of 5000+ household and over 10000 individual-level observations per
wave. Retrospective job history information is collected for the 12 months prior to the current wave
interview. In addition, the survey contains information on complete work-life histories since leaving
further education. Appendix 8.4 illustrates the structure of the BHPS, whilst full data preparation
steps are detailed in Ball (2010).
Unlike the US Displaced Workers Survey (DWS), the BHPS contains regional location information
relating to the time of displacement, the time an individual was searching for a job, and the time of
re-employment. This allows control for the timing of moves across regional entities, and thus the
identication of regional eects. This regional information is available on a spell-by-spell basis for
spells lasting less than a year. For spells which have lasted for more than one year, regional location
is coded at survey date. The date a move took place is also available, as well as whether an individual
moved for employment reasons. Location information is only collected at the beginning of each labour
market spell in the pre-1.9.90 data. 1.3% (153) of the sample move travel-to-work area between labour
market spells, whereas 4.3% (527) move travel-to-work area over the sample period as a whole. 1.6%
(190) of the sample move local authority between labour market spells, whereas this gure is 5.92%
(718) over the sample as a whole. These gures are based on the Original Sample Members (OSM),
using the current sample selection strategy, for the full 11 waves. These gures do not change markedly
once the window is increased to 2 years around job take-up, to capture tied moves. They suggest that
selection into a move across regional boundaries (LAD, TTWA) between labour market spells is less
of a concern. Furthermore, household moves which are conned within the geographical entity of
3interest -local authority, travel-to-work area - are ignored.
Local Area Quarterly Labour Force Survey (LAQLFS) The LAQLFS is available for the
period 1992q2-2006q1. Quarter 3 waves of the Local Area Quarterly Labour Force Survey are used
to link the regional-level data to the BHPS. 20 out of the 323 local authority areas could not be
matched, due to changes in the way regions are classied in 1996. In 1996, 46 Unitary Authorities
were introduced in the UK. Initial attempts to acquire a concordance table from ONS Geography
failed. The strategy adopted was to match regions by name. This may not be the most accurate
procedure, as there are cases where pre-1996 regions were split into smaller administrative entities.
However, given the tools at my disposal this seemed the best approach2. Leaving these regions
out of the individual-level data (dropping anyone who ever lived in them) does not seem to have a
signicant impact on the composition of the sample, suggesting that results are likely to be robust to
this restriction. Furthermore, pairwise t-tests of the null hypothesis that dropping problematic does
not have an impact on the means cannot be rejected. Ball (2009) can be consulted for a detailed
discussion of the dataset construction.
In order to investigate the importance of the regional dimension, controls are introduced for the ILO
Unemployment, the Vacancies-to-Unemployment Ratio, Accessibility, and whether the respondent is
living in an Urban area at the time of interview. Labour market tightness is dened at the TTWA
level of aggregation. Accessibility and Urban indicators in the BHPS are acquired from the National
Statistics Postcode Directory (NSPD) and measured at the Output Area level of aggregation. Lo-
cal authorities may contain a mixture of urban and rural Output Areas, thus using a classication
at this level of aggregation is likely to be inappropriate implying that these measures are unlikely
to capture the local labour market environment very well. Adopting the approach implemented in
Ball (2009), Urban combines the Department for Environment, Food & Rural Aairs (DEFRA) local
authority-based urban/rural classication, valid for England only, with the output area-based NSPD
classication for Scotland & Wales (implying some measurement error). Unemployment incidence
and the length of previous interruption are controlled for in all regional level regressions. Detailed
continuous sub-regional data is unavailable from most standard sources over the period of interest.
Furthermore, the Special Access LFS is only available from 2003, which would not allow me to con-
struct full work-life histories given that this information is only collected in the second and third waves.
Thus the Local Area Quarterly Labour Force Survey (LAQLFS) is drawn upon in order to construct
these measures. The LAQLFS is available for the period 1992q2 - 2006q1. Given the rotating nature
of the LFS, 1991q3 values are assumed to be the same as those in 1992q3. The BHPS and LAQLFS
are linked at the local authority level of aggregation using the concordance scheme developed in (Ball,
2The 20 non-matches include: Redcar & Cleveland; East Riding of Yorkshire; North East Lincolnshire; North Som-
erset; South Gloucestershire; Swindon; Medway Towns; West Berkshire; Conway; Debighshire; Flintshire; Bridgend;
Caerphilly; Aberdeenshire; West Dunbartonshire; East Ayrshire; East Dunbartonshire; North Ayrshire; North Lanark-
shire; South Lanarkshire
42009).
Focus is limited to a sample of males aged between 16 and 58 and directly interviewed at Wave
1, excluding proxy interviews3. These individuals are followed from when they rst leave full-time
education until 65. In order to be able to derive full employment biographies for the Original Sample
Members (OSM) used in the study, multiple data sources needed to be drawn on. This raised awareness
of the inherent complexities in the survey design. Clearly dened, well justied data preparation steps
are required in order to ensure further biases are not imparted on the nal data. This sensitivity of the
BHPS work-life histories to data preparation steps is well highlighted in (Paull, 2002). For this reason
an extensive technical appendix to this paper was created, (Ball, 2010). This details the rules-based
approach adopted to minimise the major sampling issues. Furthermore, the study aims to test the
van Dijk and Folmer (1999) hypotheses by matching the individual-level data to the regional context
in which these individuals reside.
3 Methodology
Ideally our treatment, job displacement, would be randomly assigned (Angrist and Pischke, 2009).
Lack of experimental data means that most studies investigating job displacement have employed ad-
ministrative or survey data. Since from a policy point of view this study's interest is in heterogeneity
across separation types, careful attention to potential sources of endogeneity is called for. Unobserved
heterogeneity, Selection Bias, Omitted Variable Bias, Measurement Error, systematic Recall Bias and
Attrition Bias are of particular concern. Simultaneity bias is less of a concern given that timing is di-
rectly controlled for. \In the absence of experimental evidence, it is very dicult to know whether the
higher earnings observed for better-educated workers are caused by their higher education, or whether
individuals with greater earnings capacity have chosen to acquire more schooling (Card, 1999, pp.
1802)." By exploiting the longitudinal nature of the BHPS the time-invariant component of ability
can be \dierenced" out using the xed eects estimator, leading to consistent estimates under OLS
when controlling for a rich set of observed characteristics. The xed eects estimator is inconsistent
under the presence of omitted variable bias (OVB) and measurement error, which is likely to be present
in survey data due to systematic Recall Bias. In extensions of this study, the regional variation in the
BHPS is exploited as an extra dimension for identication.
3The initial interest was in replicating Arulampalam (2001)'s results and then extending the observation window
with the extra survey waves now available. Due to lack of information about the exact data preparation steps, an exact
replication was not possible. Replication is made harder due to regular updating of the panel due to coding errors, etc.
I am grateful to Professor Arulampalam for providing her SPSS code detailing her data prepartion steps. Unfortunately
this code referred to a preliminary version of the paper and the preparation steps used to construct certain key variables
were missing. Granted, I developed alternative proxies due to these inherent ambiguities. Alternative proxies for key
indicators were developed in order to address these ambiguities. This exercise raised valid questions about the robustness
of ndings to these data preparation steps.




 + t + i + "it 8 i = 1:::n; 8 t = 1:::T (1)
Where:
wit = Hourly wage of individual i at time t, de
ated by CPI in 1991 prices.
xit = Matrix of observed personal and workplace characteristics.
di = Dummy variable, taking the value 1 if individual i entered the current employ-
ment spell via a spell of interruption.
Zit = Matrix of selected individual characteristics (interacted with dit).
t = Time dummy.
i = Time-invariant individual-specic error component.
"i = Idiosyncratic error component.
The Within-Groups estimator, ln(wit   wi) = (xit   xi)0+(dit   di)0
+(t  )+("it   "i) 8 i =
1:::n; 8 t = 1:::T, is still consistent in a model with the inclusion of endogenous regressors, provided
that the source of endogeneity is time-invariant, e.g. Due to ability bias (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).
The parameters in specifaction 1 are estimated as deviations from their individual-specic means, with
appropriate adjustments made to the standard errors. Unobserved heterogeneity, i, is modelled as
i = i + "it. When parameters are estimated as deviations from their means, the individual-specic
error component drops out, given its time invariant nature, leaving us with only the idiosyncratic
error component to deal with. By construction "it is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables.
A Random Eects estimation strategy is not implemented due lack of an appropriate instrument
for ability, implying that the assumption E("itjxit) = 0 is inappropriate in this case. Furthermore,
Fixed Eects relies on the identifying assumption that E("itjxit;i) = 0, i.e. Conditional exogeneity.
Fixed eects estimates are susceptible to attenuation bias due to measurement error. If a variable is
persistent, incidence this year makes incidence next year more likely, and changes from year-to-year are
misreported/miscoded, although there may be measurement error in a sub-sample of the population
in each year observed year-to-year changes in the variable will be mostly noise (Angrist and Pischke,
2009). This implies more measurement error in dierenced estimates than in their levels, explaining
one reason why xed eects estimates are generally smaller than their OLS counterparts(Angrist and
Krueger, 1999).
The sample appearing in the wage equation is unlikely to be a random sample of the underlying
population. For individuals that do not appear in the wage equation, the wage distribution will be
truncated at zero. However, this truncation is non-ignorable since it is the product of a underlying
deterministic process in
uencing the labour market participation decision. List-wise deletion of cases
in which real wages are not observed would lead OLS to produce biased estimates of the true extent
of Wage Scarring, due to sample-selection bias, as these cases cannot be assumed missing at random.
This incidental truncation is corrected for using the Heckman selection model (Heckman, 1979).
6Selection Rule: For an individual to appear in the wage equation they must be continuously present
in the survey for at least two wave since the beginning (1991); a positive real wage must be observed
(dened only for those in employment and continuously present) and they must be in employment at
least twice. Since the Within-Groups estimator applied to an earnings regression requires an individual
to be in employment at least twice, individuals appearing in the wage equation are not representative of
all workers in employment. This fact is explicitly taken into account when formulating this selection
rule (Arulampalam, 2001). Sensitivity of the results to the selection rule is formally tested in the
robustness checks for attrition bias.
Identication Strategy: Fixed Eects relies on the identifying assumption that E("itjxit;i) = 0,
i.e. the Conditional exogeneity/ Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA). Strategies are adopted
in an attempt to satisfy this criterion. The advantage of using survey data is that this allows a
rich set of regressors commonly thought to impact on wage outcomes to be controlled for, including
regional-level interactions with state dependence. Regional-level identiers in the BHPS allow time-
varying regional characteristics to be incorporated. Heteroscedasticity is controlled for using White's
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. Furthermore, a rules-based approach to data preparation
is taken in order to minimise measurement error and thus omitted variable bias (see Ball, 2010). How
to control for the fact that most factors that in
uence unemployment also in
uence accepted wages
is the fundamental identication challenge faced when attempting to control for sample selection (in-
cidental truncation) using the Heckman two-step approach (Heckman, 1979). Exclusion restrictions
in the rst stage participation strengthen identication, however a fundamental challenge is that of
nding valid instruments. Exclusion restrictions include whether an individual has children, which
is expected to impact on re-employment probability through mobility costs, but not on wage oers
(Stevens, 1997). This instrument may not have the appropriate properties of a good instrument, as
the relationship between fertility and labour supply suggests the presence of endogeneity between the
presence of children and labour market outcomes (Angrist and Krueger, 1999). Father's occupation
when 14, whether they were self-employed at 14, and current housing tenure are also included as
identifying variables in the rst stage participation decision. As in Arulampalam (2001), the Travel to
Work Area (TTWA) unemployment rate in 1991 is included as in as a further exclusion restriction, the
identifying assumption being that historic local labour market unemployment rates impact directly on
the current unemployment rate and only indirectly on the current wage, through the current unem-
ployment rate. Ideally 1981 Census would have been used to gauge the TTWA unemployment rate.
This proved impossible due to severe lack of concordance between the TTWA classication methods
used4. A 2 test for the joint signicance of the identifying variables is signicant at the 99.9 percent
level. Redundancies are more likely to be orthogonal to individual characteristics, relative to other
4No guidance is provided in Arulampalam (2001) on how she dened certain key variables, including the 1991 Travel
to Work Area (TTWA) unemployment rate. In the subsequent analysis this is dened as the total of male and female
unemployment as a proportion of the resident economically active population.
7separation types. However, even within the redundancy category, there is likely to be heterogeneity.
Unfortunately this cannot be controlled for, since the BHPS does not distinguish between mass layos
and plant closures.
4 Descriptive Analysis
In the analysis that proceeds, previous labour market history is considered in relation to current
labour market status, given that the individual reporting is currently employed. Preliminary analysis
- not reported - highlighted close similarities between the sample of individuals directly interviewed in
1991 and the sub-sample used in the wage analysis (continuously present for at least 2 waves). These
similarities persisted when the sample was further conditioned to exclude those reporting themselves as
self-employment status at interview date, as well as when problematic regions are dropped. Moreover,
the composition of the non-extended and extended samples are very similar (Table 9, Appendix Section
8.1). Thus the descriptive analysis mainly focusses on the extended 1991-2001 period.
Table 1: Current Employer Tenure, by previous labour market status, 1991-2001(x).
Previous Status
Tenure EMP UNEMP OLF Total
<1 year 790 375 98 1263
1-2 years 649 263 102 1014
2-3 years 556 191 87 834
3-4 years 488 152 72 712
4-5 years 407 126 64 597
5-10 years 1596 437 260 2293
>10 years 2623 532 1058 4213
x - Excluding: Redcar & Cleveland; East Riding of Yorkshire; North East Lincolnshire; North Somerset; South Gloucestershire; Swin-
don; Medway Towns; West Berkshire; Conway; Debighshire; Flintshire; Bridgend; Caerphilly; Aberdeenshire; West Dunbartonshire;
East Ayrshire; East Dunbartonshire; North Ayrshire; North Lanarkshire; South Lanarkshire.
Previous labour market states considered (since leaving full-time education): Employment/Self-Employment; Unemployment; OLF (Out of the
Labour Force).
Table 1 excludes problematic regions. Previous \Out of the Labour Force"(OLF) includes previous full-
time education (see Arulampalam, 2001, Table 2: pp. F594), with the sample restricted to individuals
who have left full-time education for the rst time. Dierences between Table 2, Arulampalam (2001),
and Table 1 can be explained not just by the extended period but also by her denition of previous
status only capturing the last ve years of work-life history. Using all information since respondents
left full time education captures a signicant proportion of continuous `rst job' employment spells
which experienced no interruption over the observation window5. Existing studies in the literature
have generally restricted their attention to high tenure individuals, thus excluding most of the early
career workforce.
Previous labour market status of `rst job' spells is recorded as \out of the labour force", given
the OECD denition. Arulampalam (2001) used the BHPS-supplied \current spell length" indicator,
recorded at interview date, to construct her tenure variable. This indicator is likely to suer from
5No interruption pre-1.9.90 that lasted longer than 1 month, given that the pre-1.9.90 data does not capture very
short spells by design. I include a control for whether individuals are in their rst job as a control in the regression
analysis.
8recall bias, leading to inconsistencies with the spell length measure used in this analysis. Summary
Table 2: Comparison of Means of Sample used in Regional Wage Analysis, 1991-2001.
PREV STAT: EMP. UNEMP. OLF
[1] [2] [3]
Region
SE 0.20 0.17 0.20
SW 0.08 0.11 0.11
East Anglia 0.05 0.05 0.03
E.Midlands 0.09 0.07 0.09
W.Midlands 0.12 0.11 0.09
N.West 0.13 0.13 0.11
Yorksire & Humber 0.06 0.13 0.10
North 0.07 0.07 0.10
Wales 0.03 0.03 0.01
Scotland 0.06 0.06 0.04
Total 7109 2076 1741
Statistics refer to sample used in the Wage analysis, which excludes the problematic regions dened in Table 1
statistics for the 1991-1997 and 1991-2001 period are presented in Table 9, Appendix Section 8.1.
According with intuition, tables 9 suggests that individuals younger than 30 are relatively more likely
to have come into their current employment spell via a spell of non-employment than those over 30.
They are more likely to be single, have an employed spouse, be less qualied, and a private tenant.
In terms of workplace characteristics, these individuals are less likely union members, more likely to
be in part-time and temporary employment, and more likely to be in unskilled manual/non-manual
jobs. On the contrary, over 30s are more likely to have made an employer-to-employer transition.
General experience levels are signicantly lower for those who came into their current employment
via a spell of unemployment, 223 months versus 265 months (1991-1997). This was lower at 198
months for previous OLF and carries over to the extended sample. However, previous status is not
an accurate predictor of current employer tenure when labour market history since leaving full-time
education is considered and non-employment is considered as a grouped category (107 months for
employer-to-employer transitions, and 116 months for those from non-employment, 1991-1997). Those
entering current employment from unemployment had 72 months of employment tenure on average,
whereas those entering from OLF spells had accumulated 173 months of current employer tenure over
1991-1997. This pattern carries itself over to the 1991-2001 period on which the descriptive analysis
focusses. Granted, those with previous interruption are consistently worse o in terms of earnings,
regardless of assumed rate of overtime pay (not reported), suggesting a lack of catchup of wages
to counterfactual levels. These tables highlight considerable dierences within the category of Non-
Employment, motivating this studies approach separating this labour market state into Unemployment
and Out of the Labour Force (OLF).
Table 2 shows substantial regional heterogeneity in the incidence of job interruption as well as
job-to-job transitions, motivating this studies interest in regional variation in wage scarring. State
dependence aside, if one is interested in how wage proles of individual change over their career,
then taking into account the nature of those separations is key given dierences in their productivity
signalling eect for future employers. Table 3 suggests that men who entered their current job via an
9employer-to-employer transition, without interruption, are 67% more likely to have quit their previous
job voluntarily. A signicant proportion of individuals who were made redundant in their previous
jobs experienced no interruption (50.64%). This gure drops to 49.97% when the information used
to construct previous status is restricted to the last ve years. Arulampalam (2001) cites a larger
gure, with 81% of redundancies experiencing no interruption in her sample. Given that I could not
establish some of her data preparation steps, it is hard to reconcile these dierences. No mention
is made in Arulampalam (2001) of the diculties of constructing continuous work-life histories, and
how she dealt with overlapping data sources. It could be that dierences in the approach to this
issue explain some of the dierences. If the methodology adopted in Arulampalam (2001) does not
adopt strategies to minimise systematic recall bias, then one could expect a general underreporting
of non-employment periods especially for frequent job changers and/or if these periods were short in
duration (Paull, 2002). However, given that the main BHPS uses a 12 month recall period, this recall
problem would not be as much of an issue as in the DWS for example. Using BHPS data Paull (2002)
does show that dierent methods for dealing with the recall issue does lead to economically signicant
dierences in results.
Table 3: Reason for leaving previous job by previous status, 1991 - 2001.
EMP UNEMP OLF
% (Obs.) % (Obs.) % (Obs.)
Redundant 0.12 (888) 0.41 (846) 0.02 (43)
Sacked/ Dismissed 0.01 (83) 0.05 (105) 0.00 (5)
Temporary Job Ended 0.03 (205) 0.11 (230) 0.02 (31)
Voluntary Quit 0.68 (4,827) 0.00 (0) 0.00 (0)
Missing 0.06 (419) 0.04 (93) 0.04 (68)
Other Reason 0.10 (688) 0.27 (567) 0.15 (262)
N/A 0.00 (0) 0.11 (235) 0.77 (1332)
Total 7109 2076 1741
Sample selection: Individuals never in self-employment at interview date. Statistics refer to sample used in the Wage analysis, which excludes the
problematic regions dened in Table 1
Figure 1 illustrates how displacement rates varied over the survey years by displacement type. Figure
1's rates are as a percentage of the population `at risk' of displacement Following Farber (1999), those
`at risk' are proxied by the number of employed workers at survey date. These rates are likely to
understate between survey-date dynamics in the sample.
Included in the analysis are workers that lost their jobs for \other" reasons. This category includes
separations for health reasons, maternity leave, and family care, etc. Individuals that lost their jobs
for unidentied/`missing'6 reasons are also included as a separate category. The \not applicable"
category captures people who have never been displaced since leaving full-time education7. Figure 1
highlights a trend increase in the proportion of people ending their jobs for \other" reasons. These
6Due to the inclusion of individuals present at Wave 2 and never after, `reason for leaving previous job' is systematically
missing for a signicant proportion of the sample that never contributed to the wave 3 job history le, i.e. exited the
sample at wave 2, as reason for leaving previous job is not asked in the wave 2 labour market history. Thus this
heterogeneous category cannot be considered missing at random.
7Estimates are likely to be sensitive to the observation period over which labour market history is considered when
constructing the control group.
10Figure 1: Reason for Previous Job Ending (as % of total displacements), 1991 - 2001.
gures rose from 12% (1991), 18.8% (1997), to 23.2% (2001). Due to the nature of the data in the
BHPS, one is unable to identify whether these individuals were subsequently recalled to their previous
employer. However, recall is less of a common practise in the UK than in the US (Farber, 1999). A
sizeable increase in the proportion of redundancies is also apparent (14.3% in 1991, peaking at 18.1%
in 1993 and dropping to 16.3% in 2001).
In addition to genuine cases, the missing category includes individuals who were left the sample at
wave 2, as well as individuals for which there was no lifetime job history (CLIFEJOB le) even though
according to the survey design there should be8. A signicant proportion of individuals continuously
present, according to our denition, did not seem to contribute to the CLIFEJOB le even though
they were present in waves 2 & 3. This category is likely to be considerably heterogenous and thus
one does not expect any precise results regarding the wage implications of this separation type.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Probit selection equation
Of the 3,516 individuals that were directly interviewed at Wave 1, 3,444 were included in the selection
equation after dropping problematic regions. This gure reduced to 2,140 when those who were ever
self-employed were dropped. This gure drops to 2029 after observations with missing real wage
values are dropped. These individuals were not all subsequently followed, implying that some of these
individuals may drop out of the sample at a later date, something -attrition- that the sample used
in the wage analysis is conditioned to not include. Following Arulampalam (2001), the Inverse Mills
Ratio (X2) = (X2)=(X2) is then interacted with year dummies in order to model how selection
8Issue with rule for dealing with pre-1.9.90 data as still remains an issue even after dropping individuals not present
for at least 3 waves.
11varies across the years. Current labour market status is also conditioned to exclude self-employment.
Individuals reporting themselves in self-employment at interview date are excluded from the main
analysis. This robustness of the results to this restriction is tested in subsequent sections.
Probit results for the rst stage participation decision are presented in Table 10, in Appendix,
Section 8.2. In a wage equation which only controls for tenure, experience and individual xed eects,
selection is signicantly negative. However, inline with both Arulampalam (2001) & Gregory and
Jukes (2001), I nd that in a fully specied model sample selection is insignicant and does not seem
to play a major role in the data considered, once observed characteristics are controlled for. The
Inverse Mills ratio (X2) = (X2)=(X2) is consistently insignicant across specications under
consideration. Furthermore, its inclusion does not have any bearing on the estimated coecients in
the full specied model.
5.2 Replication of Arulampalam (2001).
Empirical results highlight persistent average wage penalties that depend on previous labour market
status. These results replicate those of Arulampalam (2001) very closely, with previous inactivity
estimated to carry an 11.6% average wage penalty into future employment. The 1991-1997 penalty
is estimated to be roughly 3% lower at 8.7% for unemployment spells. Relative to a job-to-job
transition, the penalty associated with previous unemployment is estimated to be 12.5% after four
years of tenure. These results are qualitatively similar in both the 1991-1997 and 1991-2001 samples
and thus not detailed here in the interest of brevity. The estimates are lower than many found in the
existing US/UK literature due to the fact that they are averaged over all possible separation types,
and are estimated relative to individuals who came into their current employment spell via a job-to-job
transition. Studies focussing on involuntary job displacement are likely to nd larger estimates of the
impact of job loss, especially if they focus on high seniority/highly attached workers who stand to
lose the most from job displacement. Furthermore, substantial heterogeneity exists across countries.
However, the wage losses found in this study are consistent with those reported by UK longitudinal
studies. See Table 13 for the results of selected studies.
6 Extensions
The evidence of State Dependence in individuals' Wage-Tenure proles on re-employment raises the
question of how this varies across reasons for leaving previous employment. Focus is limited to impact
of involuntary displacement (redundancies). The denition of a displacement implemented in this anal-
ysis is consistent with Arulampalam (2001). The impact of involuntary displacements (redundancies)
is gauged relative to a reference group which includes all other separation types (dismissals, temporary
job ended, other reasons), job-to-job transitions (which are not considered as job displacement) and
the group of never displaced (who were in their rst labour market spell). I control for the missing
category in all specications and do not include this in the base category. Where an individual left
12their previous employment for a better job and subsequently experienced a spell of non-employment,
this is treated as a move for undened (other) reasons. This aects 0.035% of separations.
6.0.1 The Eect of Redundancy & Previous Unemployment/ Inactivity
Contrary to Arulampalam (2001), who nds a positive average impact of 1.8%, specication 1, Table 4,
suggests that being made redundant carries an average wage penalty of around 7.0% in the subsequent
job. This is not a new observation in the literature, and accords with intuition more closely than the
aforementioned result. \A surprising fraction of job changes (with and without on-the-job search)
involve wage cuts (Devine & Kiefer, 1993)." Holding reason for leaving previous job constant, coming
into the current employment spell via a spell of unemployment carries a large wage penalty of 10%
(signicant at the 5% level). Although insignicant at conventional levels, for those that were made
redundant the penalty associated with previous unemployment is non-linear with age, being lower for
those under 45. This suggests that on average, the impact of being made redundant and experiencing
a spell of disruption does not carry a signicantly dierent wage penalty to other separation types
over and above the impact of experiencing a spell of unemployment.
Data limitations implied that Arulampalam (2001) was not able to identify the impact of previous
unemployment and non-employment separately. Specication 1 separates out previous unemployment
and inactivity (out of the labour force). Both the incidence and the duration of unemployment
carry a signicant negative wage penalty into subsequent employment. Controlling for duration,
previous unemployment carries a wage penalty of 6.2% into subsequent employment spells. Moreover,
unemployment spells lasting between six and twelve months carry an additional 8.9% penalty into
subsequent employment relative to those lasting less than six. Specication 3 suggests that the wage
penalty associated with unemployment reduces with incidence. However the penalty associated with
inactivity does not diminish with incidence in the same fashion. The rst spell carries the same
wage penalty as the next. This should not be interpreted as suggesting that experiencing more
unemployment spells is better than less. It may be that unemployment leads to re-employment in
lower paying jobs, implying a lower wage penalty due to future incidence.
The general story seems to be robust to extensions of the observation period, bar from the duration
eect (specications 4 to 6, table 4). Whilst previous inactivity remains insignicant once holding
duration constant, the impact of unemployment duration loses signicance over and above the impact
of a state dependence in the extended sample. Moreover, OLF spells lasting between six and twelve
months are estimated to carry a signicant 19.5% wage penalty relative to those lasting less than six.
The estimates from the 1991 to 2001 period are likely to be more precisely estimated, suggesting that
the impact of inactivity runs primarily through the duration eect. However, extending the observation
period strengthens the argument that the penalty associated with inactivity doesn't diminish with
incidence.
13Table 4: Log Real Hourly Wage Equations for Male Sub-Sample, Individual-level observed
heterogeneity controls, Previous Status unrestricted.
1991-1997 1991-2001
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Reason for leaving jobx.
redundant -0.070* -0.071**
(0.039) (0.030)
Previous Status (ref. Previous Employment.)
Unemployment -0.100** -0.062* -0.145** -0.102** -0.084** -0.150**
(0.041) (0.034) (0.036) (0.031) (0.028) (0.031)
Inactivity -0.082 -0.054 -0.135** -0.079 0.009 -0.142**
(0.066) (0.084) (0.057) (0.049) (0.070) (0.049)
Reason for leaving job by previous labour market status.











Length of previous interruption (ref. < 6 months.)
Unemployment
6-12 months -0.089* -0.060
(0.049) (0.039)
12 months+ -0.033 -0.026
(0.074) (0.053)
Inactivity
6-12 months -0.078 -0.195**
(0.114) (0.091)
12 months+ -0.091 -0.129
(0.112) (0.092)
Number of previous unemployment spells (>1).
1+ spell -0.074 -0.057
(0.059) (0.047)
Previous Unemployment
1+ spell 0.119** 0.107**
(0.058) (0.044)
Previous Inactivity
1+ spell 0.033 0.072
(0.144) (0.101)
N 7666 7666 7666 10912 10912 10912
LL 1430 1418 1427 1468 1459 1469
 R2 0.369 0.367 0.368 0.513 0.513 0.514
RMS error 0.202 0.202 0.202 0.212 0.213 0.212
AIC -2.7e+03 -2.7e+03 -2.7e+03 -2.7e+03 -2.7e+03 -2.8e+03
x Relative to quits to better job, temporary contract ended, other reasons & individuals who never experienced a displacement (rst job spells).
Dummy variable for missing reasons included in all specications. Sample selection: Individuals never in self-employment at interview date.
Full set of control variables: Current tenure, cumulative experience, age dummies, time dummies, a dummy for men whose current job if the
rst since leaving full time education, labour market experience dummies, marital status, health disability, temp/xed-term contract, part-time
job, employment sector, rm size, received training in current job, job type, regional dummies and industry dummies. Correction for selectivity
interacted with time dummies also included.
Full results are available from the author on request.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
6.1 The Eect of Redundancy & Regional Heterogeneity
The results so far could be subject to a heterogeneity explanation if, conditional on regional mobility,
the wage penalty due to job displacement varies within a country. The van Dijk and Folmer (1999)
hypothesis would imply that the short-run wage penalty faced by individuals who experience unem-
ployment in high unemployment regions will be relatively lower than that faced by the equivalent
individual in low unemployment regions, due to their unemployment being seen as more a character-
istic of the region rather than an individual productivity signal. In accordance with the predictions of
job search theory, one would expect the average wage penalty associated with disruptions to be higher
in slack than in tight labour markets.
14Job search theory would predict that individuals displaced in tight labour markets will face lower
job search costs due to more vacancies being available relative to the stock of job seekers (Cahuc and
Zylberberg, 2004). In slack labour markets, the prospects of a successful match are lower as there will
be more unemployment job seekers applying for a small pool of job vacancies. Of course, highly mobile
(young and skilled) workers will be more able to mitigate this phenomenon by migrating to a tight
labour market, however this may be less likely for less skilled workers and older workers with more
regional attachments. Granted, individuals migrating to another region may face larger wage penalties
than the equivalent worker nding reemployment in their pre-displacement region (Carrington, 1993).
In the UK context, the closest approximation to a self-contained local labour market is the Travel-
To-Work Area (TTWA) level of aggregation (see Ball, 2009 for more information). The criterion
on which TTWAs are dened is that: at least 75% of the resident economically active population
actually work in the area, and that of everyone working in the area, at least 75% actually live in the
area (Oce for National Statistics, 2008). An important limitation of the TTWA measure is that:
\[a]s some, predominantly professional and managerial, workers have increased their travel to work
distance the self containment factor has been reduced. In eect this removes the extreme cases, so the
TTWA denition has moved closer to a manual/ semi-skilled based denition (NOMIS, 1998)." The
underlying diculty of dening self-contained labour markets implies that an argument relating to the
regional-specicity of human capital will be confounded by the fact that highly mobile young and/or
skilled workers are less likely to work in their region of residence than their less skilled counterparts.
Conducting this analysis at the Local Authority aggregation level makes the local labour market story
even more implausible. A more plausible explanation may be that region of residence act purely as
a signal of potential ability in the recruitment process. Individuals may select into a move across
regional boundaries (LAD, TTWA) between labour market spells. However, evidence from the BHPS
suggests that this is less of a concern given the low incidence (see Section 2).
6.1.1 TTWA Labour market tightness
Inconsistent with our priors, table 5 suggests that the average wage penalty associated with a job
interruption is slightly higher in slack than tight local labour markets. In tight local labour markets,
a spell of unemployment carries an 8.5% wage penalty into subsequent employment. This gure rises
to 9.4% in slack Travel-to-Work Areas. Spell of inactivity carry an 8.5% wage penalty if experienced
in tight labour markets. However, this penalty is insignicant at conventional levels. A signicant
10.2% wage penalty is associated with inactivity spells experienced in slack labour markets. Whilst
the impact of inactivity remains robust over the 1991-2001 period, no signicant dierences in the
penalty associated with unemployment persist, conditional on labour market tightness. This result
could be confounded by heterogeneity across separation types. Controlling for reason for leaving
previous job, the average wage penalty associated with a spell of unemployment experienced in a tight
local labour market is marginally larger over both periods (Table 6). But the average only tells part of
15Table 5: Employment spells by average previous labour market characteristics (\Rea-
son for leaving previous job" not controlled for).
Average Previous Labour Market Characteristics.
Time Period Tight Slack Urban Rural High U Low U
Previous Labour Market Status (ref. Employment).[
Unemployment
1991 - 1997 -8.5%** -9.4%** -5.2% -14.0%** -8.4%** -9.7%**
1991 - 2001 -9.8%** -9.8%** -7.2%** -14.1%** -9.7%** -10.4%**
Inactivity
1991 - 1997 -8.5% -10.2%* -6.7% -11.4%* -9.8%* -5.6%
1991 - 2001 -7.8%* -10.2%** -7.3% -8.9% -8.9%* -6.2%
Previous Labour Market Status (ref. Employment).y
Unemployment
1991 - 1997 -7.9%** -9.3%** -5.2% -14.0%** -8.4%** -8.8%**
1991 - 2001 -9.1%** -10.6%** -7.2%** -14.1%** -10.0%** -9.8%**
Inactivity
1991 - 1997 -8.5% -9.2%* -6.7% -11.4%* -8.3% -9.4%*
1991 - 2001 -6.4% -10.2%** -7.3% -8.9% -7.8%* -8.4%
[ Denitions: Tight Labour Market - Vacancies/Unemployment ratio  2/3*Median. High Unemployment Region - Unemploy-
ment Rate  2/3*Median. Urban/Rural - Dened in text. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
y Denitions: Tight Labour Market - Vacancies/Unemployment ratio  Median. High Unemployment Region - Unemployment
Rate  Median. Urban/Rural - Dened in text. Full results in Appendix 8.3. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Sample selection: Individuals never in self-employment at interview date. Full set of control variables: age dummies, time
dummies, a dummy for men whose current job if the rst since leaving full time education, labour market experience dummies,
marital status, health disability, temp/xed-term contract, part-time job, employment sector, rm size, received training in
current job, job type, regional dummies and industry dummies/ Correction for selectivity interacted with time dummies also
included.
the story. Redundancy followed by unemployment in tight labour markets implies a 2.2% wage gain
(13.7%-11%) on average, with no signicant age variation in this eect. However, unemployment in
slack local areas carries the full 9.4% wage penalty, with no variation by age. This story is robust to
extensions of the observation period, although the wage gain becomes marginal (0.1% gain) in tight
labour markets. Being made redundant and then experiencing a spell of inactivity in a slack labour
market has a large positive impact on wage growth for the over 45's, whereas the impact is negative but
insignicant at conventional levels for those under this age threshold. However these estimates loses
signicance when the observation window is extended. This may be capturing the fact that higher
levels of human capital and less nancial constraints imply that the older workforce are more likely
to engage in productive search (Lippman and McCall, 1976). Productive search suggests a positive
relationship between non-employment duration and re-employment wages. This could also be due to
an inappropriate control group, as wages are generally higher for those over 45 (Kletzer and Fairlie,
2003).
Panel 3 looks at the time pattern of wage scarring whilst holding reason for leaving previous job
constant. No signicant variation by age is found. This specication suggests that a higher variance in
the wage penalty associated with a spell of unemployment experienced in tight relative to slack local
labour markets over the 1991 -1997 period. The penalty associated with previous redundancy, and
subsequent unemployment, increases roughly monotonically with time on the job in both tight and
slack labour markets. Over the 1991-1997 period, this decreases from a 13.7% gain in the rst year
(6.7% penalty, insignicantly dierent to the average eect), a 1.9% gain in the second (13.7%-11.8%),
a 2% penalty in the third (13.7%-15.7%), and a long-run 1.3% wage penalty (13.7%-15%) relative to
the counterfactual. However, all the short-term gains are in tight labour markets. The biggest wage
16losses are associated with unemployment spells experienced in slack TTWAs. This wage penalty is
12.4% in the rst year of tenure, 22.1% in the second, and 11.5% in the long-run. This story carries
over to extensions of the observation period. However, being made redundant and then having a
spell of inactivity is found to carry an insignicant wage penalty into subsequent employment spells,
relative to the baseline, regardless of where it is experienced.
Table 6: Employment Spells: Labour Market Tightnessy.
Previous Labour Market Status (ref. Employment).
Model A Model B







Reason for leaving prev. job
2. Redundancyx -8.1%* -7.2%** -8.3%* -7.3%**
Prev. Labour Market Status X Prev. Redundancyx (ref. Employment).
Unemployment Age 1991 - 1997 1991 - 2001 1991 - 1997 1991 - 2001
Tight ALL 13.7%** 10.6%* 13.4%** 10.5%**
 45 -5.1% -7.8% -5.5% -8.0%
Slack ALL 7.6% 6.3% 5.3% 5.8%
 45 -3.1% -3.7% -2.2% -3.3%
Inactivity
Tight ALL -7.5% 3.8% -10.7% 2.4%
 45 12.1% 10.9% 12.4% 11.6%
Slack ALL -16.2% -5.9% -5.9% 1.0%
 45 47.4%** 23.0% 57.6%** 35.2%**
Model B: Prev. Unemployment X Tenure (years) on Current Job x.
3. Unemp [0,1) [1,2) [2,3) [4,1)
1991 - 1997
Tight -6.3% -11.8%* -15.7%** ! -15.0%**
Slack -12.4%** -22.1%** -7.0% ! -11.5%**
1991 - 2001
Tight -7.6%** -11.4%** -12.4%** ! -13.3%**
Slack -15.2%** -18.8%** -6.3% ! -10.6%**
y Tight labour market - Vacancies/Unemployment ratio > 2/3*Median. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
x Relative to quits to better job, temporary contract ended, other reasons & individuals who never experienced a displacement (rst job spells).
Holding missing reasons for leaving previous job constant in all specications. Sample selection: Individuals never in self-employment at
interview date. Full set of control variables: age dummies, time dummies, a dummy for men whose current job if the rst since leaving full time
education, labour market experience dummies, marital status, health disability, temp/xed-term contract, part-time job, employment sector, rm
size, received training in current job, job type, regional dummies and industry dummies/ Correction for selectivity interacted with time dummies
also included.
NB. Previous inactivity * time dummy interactions mostly insignicant. Full results available from author on request.
Time-varying Regional Heterogeneity Accessibility enters positively and signicantly into spec-
ication 2 (These results, not presented here, are available from the author on request). Individuals
living in accessible regions earn on average 20-24% more than individuals living in inaccessible regions,
holding all else constant and depending on time-period considered. Although negative, the impact of
living in an urban area on earnings is insignicant in all specications, and halved in the extended
sample. The 12 month moving average of the change in ILO unemployment rate enters positively and
signicantly. Individuals living in local labour markets with higher longer run unemployment growth
rates earn more on average, whilst the quarterly unemployment rate is insignicant. A one standard
deviation change in the 12 month average change in quarterly ILO unemployment increases real wages
17by 78%, everything else held constant. Although inconsistent with a priori expectations, this eect
is not robust to extensions of the observation period as is likely a feature of the economy during
the 1991-1997 period the rst half of which was characterised by recession with unemployment levels
peaking in the rst quarter of 1993. These results are robust to the inclusion of both local authority
and travel-to-work area xed eects, suggesting that the main story seems to be robust for this period
of observation. These results are generally invariant to the choice of specication. Therefore, in the
interest of brevity, I do not discuss them further in subsequent sections.
Table 7: Employment Spells: URBAN/RURALy.
Previous Labour Market Status (ref. Employment).
Model A Model B







Reason for leaving prev. job
2. Redundancyx -7.8%* -7.4%** -7.8%* -7.4%**
Prev. Labour Market Status X Prev. Redundancyx (ref. Employment).
Unemployment Age 1991 - 1997 1991 - 2001 1991 - 1997 1991 - 2001
Urban ALL 7.6% 7.7% 7.5% 7.7%
 45 -2.4% -4.3% -2.2% -4.0%
Rural ALL 21.7%** 16.7%* 21.4%** 17.3%*
 45 -9.5% -12.4% -9.7% -13.5%
Inactivity
Urban ALL -14.3% 0.2% -15.6% 1.0%
 45 38.0%** 27.0%** 34.1%* 27.1%*
Rural ALL -8.3% -7.9% -3.9% 3.9%
 45 9.0% 18.8% 7.1% 14.6%
Model B: Prev. Unemployment X Tenure (years) on Current Job x.
3. Unemp [0,1) [1,2) [2,3) [4,1)
1991 - 1997
Urban -1.6% -10.3%* -7.2% ! -9.6%*
Rural -18.6%** -15.5%** -24.3%** ! -21.9%**
1991 - 2001
Urban -4.4% -11.2%** -7.7%** ! -9.6%**
Rural -16.7%** -15.0%** -16.1%** ! -20.4%**
y Urban/Rural - Dened in text. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
x Relative to quits to better job, temporary contract ended, other reasons & individuals who never experienced a displacement (rst job spells).
Holding missing reasons for leaving previous job constant in all specications. Sample selection: Individuals never in self-employment at
interview date. Full set of control variables: age dummies, time dummies, a dummy for men whose current job if the rst since leaving full time
education, labour market experience dummies, marital status, health disability, temp/xed-term contract, part-time job, employment sector, rm
size, received training in current job, job type, regional dummies and industry dummies/ Correction for selectivity interacted with time dummies
also included.
NB. Previous inactivity * time dummy interactions mostly insignicant. Full results available from author on request.
6.1.2 Local Authority-level characteristics
Due to lack of detailed controls at the travel-to-work area (TTWA) level of aggregation, I disag-
gregate the study to the local authority (LAUA) level in order to control for detailed regional-level
characteristics. This exercise is carried out whilst maintaining a one-to-one link between the LAUA
and TTWA levels of aggregation. Controlling for the length of interruption, unemployment incidence
and regional-level characteristics, Table 5 suggests that, relative to a job-to-job transition, the im-
pact of experiencing both inactivity and unemployment carry higher wage penalties for individuals
18living in rural local authorities. Coming into the current employment spell via unemployment in a
rural local authority carries a 14% wage penalty over the 1991-1997 period, relative to a job-to-job
transition. This compares to an insignicant 5.2% penalty associated with the same experience in
urban LAUAs. Likewise, experiencing a spell of inactivity in a rural LAUA carries a 11.4% relative
wage penalty, whereas the penalty associated with urban local authorities is lower at 6.7% and in-
signicant at conventional levels. Average results are robust to extensions of the observation period.
This may be driven by the fact that there are less jobs in rural areas, so an individual would have
to search wider in order to nd re-employment. However, local authorities cannot credibly be con-
sidered self-contained labour markets. It may be the case that less skilled workers are more likely to
nd local re-employment, however this is less likely for the mobile skilled workforce for whom even
travel-to-work areas may be inappropriate. If distance is a factor when considering job oers, this
may manifest itself in a negative correlation between urbanity and unemployment duration given that
urban areas are generally characterised by higher levels of economic activity. However, Ball and Wilke
(2009) showed that urban conurbations were amongst the worst places in Great Britain to live in terms
of unemployment experiences. The time pattern of Wage Scarring suggests that being made redun-
dant and then experiencing unemployment in an urban area is equally damaging for future earnings
potential, independent of age. Taken together, these results suggest profound negative implications
of unemployment experience for those living in urban areas, lending further support to Government
initiatives like New Deal for Communities targeting these locations.
Controlling for reason for leaving previous job, only the impact of an unemployment spell expe-
rienced in a rural local authority remains signicant at conventional levels over the 1991-1997 period
(Panel 1). Whilst a spell of rural unemployment carries a 19.3% wage penalty into subsequent em-
ployment, relative to a job-to-job transition the penalty associated with urban unemployment spell is
insignicant at conventional levels. Moreover, the impact of rural unemployment is non-linear with
age (see panel 2, column 3). For those under 45, a spell of unemployment experienced in a rural local
authority after being made redundant carries a 2.4% (21.7% -19.3%) wage gain into future employ-
ment relative to a other separation types. However, over 45s experience the full 19.3% wage penalty
regardless. Since the over 45s are more likely to be mortgaged home owners, this result may be due
to nancial and residential mobility constraints implying that displaced mortgaged home owners are
more likely to lower their reservation wages and accept local re-employment than renters who have
more 
exibility to widen their job search (Coulson and Fisher, 2009). Although the average wage
penalty associated with inactivity is insignicant over the 1991-1997 period, being made redundant
and then experiencing a spell of inactivity in an urban local authority carries a substantial wage gain
into future employment for the over 45s (38%). These results are robust to time-period extensions.
The wage scar associated with previous inactivity is insignicant at conventional levels over the
1991-1997 period. Granted, a large and persistent wage penalty is associated with unemployment
both in urban and rural local authorities. The magnitude of this eect is twice as large in rural
areas on average (see panel 3). Moreover, this story carries over to extensions of the observation
19period to 1991-2001. Over the 1991-1997 period, for the under 45s redundancy and subsequent rural
unemployment implies a 2.8% wage gain (-18.6% + 21.4%) in the rst year of tenure, a 5.9% gain
(-15.5% + 21.4%) in the second, a 2.9% wage loss (-24.3% + 21.4%) in the third and a long-run wage
penalty of 0.5% (-21.9% + 21.4%). However, the over 45s the same scenario implies the full penalty
of 18.6% in the rst year, 15.5% in the second, increasing to 21.9% in the long-run. Redundancy and
subsequent urban unemployment implies an insignicant 1.6% wage loss in the rst year, rising to
a signicant 10.3% penalty in the second, and a 9.6% wage penalty in the long-run, relative to the
job-to-job transitions. No signicant age variation is found in the impact of redundancy followed by
urban unemployment, and these results carry over to extensions of the time frame.
Table 8: Employment Spells: High Unemployment/Low Unemploymenty.
Previous Labour Market Status (ref. Employment).
Model A Model B
1. 1991 - 1997 1991 - 2001 1991 - 1997 1991 - 2001
Unemployment
High U -10.8%** -10.8%**
Low U -13.1%** -12.1%**
Inactivity
High U -4.9% -6.7%
Low U -1.8% -4.8%
Reason for leaving prev. job
2. Redundancyx -7.8%* -7.2%** -7.8%* -7.3%**
Prev. Labour Market Status X Prev. Redundancyx (ref. Employment).
Unemployment Age 1991 - 1997 1991 - 2001 1991 - 1997 1991 - 2001
High U ALL 11.9%* 10.1%* 11.5%* 10.2%*
 45 -2.2% -6.9% -2.1% -6.5%
Low U ALL 19.9%** 13.4%** 19.9%** 13.7%**
 45 -16.6%** -12.0%* -15.7%** -11.9%*
Inactivity
High U ALL -12.2% -1.5% -1.0% 0.0%
 45 9.8% 7.9% 13.7% 15.1%
Low U ALL 22.6% -4.9% 27.2%* 28.8%**
 45 -5.4% 13.4% -8.6% -10.3%
Model B: Prev. Unemployment X Tenure (years) on Current Job x.
3. Unemp [0,1) [1,2) [2,3) [4,1)
1991 - 1997
High U -6.6% -12.1%** -13.1%** ! -15.2%**
Low U -13.7% -17.8%** -16.0%** ! -16.0%**
1991 - 2001
High U -8.0% -12.3%** -11.3%** ! -13.5%**
Low U -13.2%* -16.0%** -10.4% ! -14.7%**
y High Unemployment labour market - ILO unemployment rate > 2/3*Median. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
x Relative to quits to better job, temporary contract ended, other reasons & individuals who never experienced a displacement (rst job spells).
Holding missing reasons for leaving previous job constant in all specications. Sample selection: Individuals never in self-employment at
interview date. Full set of control variables: age dummies, time dummies, a dummy for men whose current job if the rst since leaving full time
education, labour market experience dummies, marital status, health disability, temp/xed-term contract, part-time job, employment sector, rm
size, received training in current job, job type, regional dummies and industry dummies/ Correction for selectivity interacted with time dummies
also included.
NB. Previous inactivity * time dummy interactions mostly insignicant. Full results available from author on request.
van Dijk and Folmer (1999) hypothesis: Robust support for the van Dijk and Folmer (1999)
hypothesis is found for the UK (Table 8, Panel 1). The strongest support being in the case of
redundancies. In a specication without controls for heterogeneity across separation-type, on average
unemployment experienced in areas of low unemployment is found to carry a higher wage penalty into
subsequent employment, all else constant (Table 5). Holding duration of interruption, unemployment
20incidence and reason for leaving previous job constant, unemployment spells experienced in high
unemployment regions carry an average 10.8% wage penalty into subsequent employment. This gure
is higher at 13.1% in low unemployment regions (Column 1). The economic signicance of these
two labour market states remains robust to extensions of the observation period, however, these
estimates may be weakened/confounded by eciency wage arguments (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984).
This argument suggests that if rms use higher wages as a means of decreasing turnover and the
incentive to shirk on-the-job, then higher unemployment levels make losing a job more costly. This
cost is predicted to decrease with the level of unemployment benets and increases with the level of
unemployment. As long as the incentive to pay eciency wages remains constant over time, then
xed eects will control for this. However, if this is related to the business cycle then this won't be
the case, although time dummies will help to absorb most of the business cycle eect.
Panel 2 demonstrates the age variation in wage scarring, by previous labour market status. In all
specications previous inactivity is insignicant at conventional levels. Over the 1991-1997 period,
redundancy and subsequent unemployment in high unemployment regions carries a signicant 1.1%
average wage gain into subsequent employment for under 45s (-10.8% + 11.9%). For those over 45, the
same scenario implies a 1.1% average wage gain. Whilst redundancy and subsequent unemployment in
low unemployment regions implies a 6.8% average wage gain (-13.1% + 19.9%) for the under 45s, the
over 45s experience a 9.8% penalty (-13.1% + 19.9% - 16.6%) in subsequent employment. This result is
robust to extending the time period, however redundancy-unemployment spells in high unemployment
regions imply a -0.7% average wage penalty, independent of age.
Redundancy and subsequent unemployment in high unemployment regions is associated with a
6.6% wage penalty which is insignicantly dierent to the 11.5% average wage gain in the rst year
of employment. This would imply a 4.9% wage gain, although this linear combination would be
insignicant at conventional levels (Panel 3). This drops to a 0.6% wage penalty (11.5% - 12.1%) in
the second year, with a long-run wage penalty of -3.7% after 4 years in employment. These penalties
are not found to vary with age group. In the case of low unemployment regions, the rst year penalty
for the under 45s is insignicantly dierent to the average wage gain of 19.9% associated with previous
redundancy and subsequent unemployment for this age category. This drops to a 2.1% gain (19.9%
- 17.8%) in the second year, and a 3.9% wage gain (19.9% - 16%) in the long-run. For the >45
age category, previous redundancy and subsequent unemployment is associated with an 13.7% wage
penalty in the rst year (insignicantly dierent to the signicant 4.2% average wage gain (19.9%-
15.7%)), dropping to 13.6% (4.2% - 17.8%) in the second and 11.8% (4.2% - 16%)in the long-run.
This time prole of wage scarring carries over to extensions of the observation period, see table 8.
Whilst the dierences across region-types are robust but relatively small on average, at around 2%,
the age dierences in the impact of redundancy remain large with signicant wage losses associated
with unemployment spells in low unemployment regions for the over 45s (11.8% in low-, versus 3.7%
in high unemployment regions, an 8.1% dierence). The Local Authority-level results are robust to
the inclusion of TTWA xed eects, allowing for correlation across LAs within each TTWA.
217 Sensitivity Analysis
Heterogeneity in human capital investment is important when considering the impact of career inter-
ruptions on future wage growth (Kunze, 2002). The OECD-dened `Out of the Labour Force' (OLF)
indicator includes full time education, a productive investment in general human capital complemen-
tary to human capital accumulated in the labour market. This measure is likely to be confounded
by dierences across labour market states within the OLF category if the sample is not conditioned
to exclude individuals who have not permanently left full-time education, or full-time education is
not dened as a separate labour market state9. The average eect of an unemployment spell seems
to be robust to classifying full-time education as a separate labour market state, however the impact
of previous inactivity becomes insignicant in all specications. This result is corroborated in the
both the 1991-1997 and 1991-2001 samples, including controls for length of previous interruption and
unemployment incidence. Although evidence of a persistent impact of previous unemployment on
future wage growth is evident in both samples, the penalty associated with inactivity is much more
variable. The long-run penalty loses signicance when the observation period is extended. In the case
of previous unemployment, controlling for regional heterogeneity, the general story remains robust
to dening full-time education as a separate labour market state. However, previous inactivity is
insignicant in all specications. Redening the thresholds used in the main analysis to the median,
instead of 2/3rds of the median, does not produce qualitatively large changes to the main story, how-
ever the result supporting the van Dijk and Folmer (1999) hypothesis loses strength on average, with
mixed long-run support at best (see Table 5, as well as Appendix Table 11 & 12. Interpretation is
provided in the footnotes.). If we are to accept the denition employed in the main analysis (2/3rds
of the Median as a threshold) over a more liberal denition (Median threshold) then support for the
hypothesis under test is strengthened. The choice of the former denition can be justied, given that
the Labour Economics literature tends to employ the former denition rather than the latter, e.g. the
\Stepping Stone" literature (Stewart, 2007). However, whilst this denition retains the property of
being objective, it could be criticised for being to an extent arbitrary.
Individuals may use self-employment as a way of cushioning the wage penalty associated with job
loss. Thus for these individuals, wage losses may be kept to a minimum. However, there are likely
to be systematic unobserved dierences between individuals that pursue the self-employed route, and
those that pursue full-time employment. Including the self-employed in the analysis is likely to impart
downward bias on the estimated average earnings losses associated with involuntary displacement
if this fact is not controlled for. In the main analysis, consistent with Arulampalam (2001), indi-
viduals were allowed to be previously self-employed, as long as they never reported themselves in
self-employment at survey date. Here self-employment is treated as a separate previous as well as
9Results for the sensitivity analysis are available from the author on request. Previous labour market status is
redened to only consider disruptions which occurred in the last 5 years of labour market history when constructing this
indicator. However, this approach is dropped in favour of the unrestricted version based on information criterion.
22current labour market state. Although wages whilst self-employed are unavailable due to the diculty
of reporting self-employment hours, this approach allows one to capture whether the wage scarring
eects of job displacement are mitigated for those entering a self-employment spell. This sign eect
is essentially an empirical question, as it is possible that individual moving into self-employment in a
declining industry may face lower earnings prospects, e.g. the 80's mining sector in the UK. Full-time
education is treated as a separate previous labour market state, the aim of this exercise being is to
shed further light on the representativeness of the main results.
Previous self-employment carries a large wage penalty into current employment, relative to a job-
to-job transition. However, this high initial penalty proves to be very temporary when contrasted with
the permanent wage penalties associated with previous unemployment and inactivity. The wage eect
of previous self-employment is insignicant on average, but positive in the long-run. There is a positive
long-run impact on wage growth for individuals entering employment via a spell of self-employment,
having been made redundant in their last spell of full-time employment. However this eect is only
positive in the long-run, with a temporary penalty in the short-run. Consistent with the previous
robustness check, the eect of previous unemployment seems robust to the regional heterogeneity
extensions.
The nal robustness check addresses the representativeness of the sample used in the analysis.
To what extent is the sample representative of the individuals interviewed in the BHPS? If this is
the case, then since the BHPS is a representative survey, the results can be extrapolated to the
population as a whole. If not, then they are unlikely to be generalisable. Whilst it is common practise
to restrict attention to the OSM who are continuously present over the observation period, recent
studies have cast doubt over the validity of BHPS-based estimates when attrition is assumed random
(Bradley et al., 2007). Results restricted to continuously present OSM are contrasted with the existing
(main analysis) results, where the OSM are followed until the rst instance of attrition. Results for
the continuously present OSM are generally very similar to those presented in the main analysis,
notably in the extended sample. The results for the 1991-1997 period are very close to the basic and
extended results presented in Arulampalam (2001). Furthermore, the regional heterogeneity story
seems invariant to this restriction.
8 Summary and Conclusion
Although institutions may vary across countries, there is generally not enough variation in institu-
tional context within a country to generate the observed dierences in wage outcomes across regions
(Carrington, 1993). The aim of this exercise is to shed some light on the potential underlying mech-
anisms at play. The main hypothesis under test is whether unemployment spells experienced in high
unemployment regions are seem by future employers as more a characteristic of the region than a
negative productivity signal (van Dijk and Folmer, 1999). If so, then what long-term implications
does this have for future wage growth (Wage Scarring)? In order to address this question, the British
23Household Panel Survey (BHPS) is used to construct continuous work-life histories following individ-
uals from rst entry into the labour market and capturing spells of employment, unemployment and
inactivity. Furthermore, this novel dataset allows for the importance of regional heterogeneity to be
gauged in the Wage Scarring context.
Strong evidence of Wage Scarring is found, with no sign of earnings recovery. Arulampalam
(2001) concludes that the rst spell of non-employment carries the highest penalty. Separating non-
employment into unemployment and inactivity spells, no evidence of a reduction in the wage penalty
associated with incidence of inactivity is found. Large regional dierences, with respect to labour
market tightness and urbanity, are found in the impact of redundancies on future wage growth, which
could not be accurately accounted for without the data structure employed. Pronounced age dierences
in the wage scarring eect of redundancies are also found in the extensions to the study. The wage
scarring eect of being made redundant is negligible for all unemployment spells experienced in tight
local labour markets, with a short-run wage gain, whilst under 45s' with the same experience in
rural areas face a marginal long-run wage gain. Experiencing a spell of unemployment in slack labour
markets implies a substantial wage scar, independent of age. For over 45s, with higher levels of regional
attachment, the wage penalty associated with rural unemployment spells is substantial with no sign
of recovery. Whilst skilled workers are prone to engage in wider job search, the over 45s are more
likely to be mortgaged home owners and thus are more likely to accept lower reservation wage jobs
locally in order to maintain mortgage payments than those without these nancial constraints. The
impact of accepting `low quality' employment, rather than waiting for a higher quality match, may
have far reaching consequences for future human capital accumulation and subsequent wage growth.
Ball and Wilke (2009) showed that urban conurbations were amongst the worst places in Great Britain
to live in terms of unemployment experiences. Estimates imply that being made redundant and then
experiencing unemployment in areas of high economic activity is equally damaging for future earnings
potential, independent of age. Taken together, this suggests that the negative implications of urban
unemployment experience are long lasting, lending further support to Government initiatives like New
Deal for Communities targeting these locations.
Robust long-run evidence is found supporting the van Dijk and Folmer (1999) hypothesis, on
average and for over 45s made redundant in their previous jobs. Redundancy implies a 3.7% wage
loss if unemployment spells were experienced in high unemployment regions, independent of age.
However, if experienced in low unemployment regions this implies a 3.9% wage gain for those under
but an 11.8% wage loss for those over 45. This story is independent of whether controls for reason
for leaving previous job are introduced, full-time education is treated as a separate labour market
state, whether the self-employed are included and whether the sample is restricted to the Original
Sample Members continuously present over the observation period. However, the penalty associated
with previous inactivity is found to be less robust. Given that inactivity is a very heterogenous state,
this is not surprising. Addressing the impact of inactivity sub-states is of interest, however this is not
pursued given that this would result in imprecise results for some categories due to small cell size.
24Cockx and Picchio (2009) model the joint distribution of unemployment duration, accepted wages,
and subsequent employment duration using detailed Belgian Administrative data. Incorporating the
impact on subsequent wage growth, using a similar approach, would be a promising avenue for future
research.
References
Addison, J. T. and Portugal, P. (1989). Job displacement, relative wage changes, and duration of
unemployment. Journal of Labor Economics, 7(3):281{302.
Angrist, J. and Pischke, J. (2009). Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist's Companion.
Princeton University Press, 41 William Street, Princeton, New Jersey 08540.
Angrist, J. D. and Krueger, A. B. (1999). Empirical strategies in labor economics. In Ashenfelter, O.
and Card, D., editors, Handbook of Labor Economics, volume 3 of Handbook of Labor Economics,
chapter 23, pages 1277{1366. Elsevier.
Arulampalam, W. (2001). Is Unemployment Really Scarring? Eects of Unemployment Experiences
on Wage. The Economic Journal, 111(475): 585{606. Royal Economic Society.
Atkinson, A. and Micklewright, J. (1991). Unemployment Compensation and Labor-Market Transi-
tions - A Critical Review. Journal of Economic Literature, 29(4): 1679{1727.
Ball, P. (2009). Construction of a linked postcode district to regional-level dataset for Great Britain.
Discussion Paper, No. 09/09, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
Ball, P. (2010). Continuous Work-Life Histories: An alternative approach using the BHPS. Nottingham
University Working Paper. mimeo., School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
Ball, P. and Wilke, R. (2009). Job seeker's allowance in Great Britain: How does the regional labour
market aect the duration until job nding? Nottingham University Working Paper, No. 09/03,
School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
Becker, G. S. (1962). Investment in human capital: A theoretical analysis. Journal of Political
Economy, 70:9.
Bentley, R. (2005). Publication of jobcentre plus vacancy statistics. Labour Market Trends. ONS.
Bradley, S., Crouchley, R., and Oskrochi, R. (2007). The impact of sample attrition on employment
participation and wages: Evidence from the BHPS. Lancaster University Working Paper. Available
at http://www.lancs.ac.uk/sta/ecasb/papers/seltrunc8.pdf.
Cahuc, P. and Zylberberg, A. (2004). Labor Economics, volume 1. MIT Press.
25Cameron, A. and Trivedi, P. (2005). Microeconometrics: Methods and Applications. Cambridge
University Press.
Card, D. (1999). The causal eect of education on earnings. In Ashenfelter, O. and Card, D., editors,
Handbook of Labor Economics, volume 3 of Handbook of Labor Economics, chapter 30, pages 1801{
1863. Elsevier.
Carrington, W. J. (1993). Wage losses for displaced workers: Is it really the rm that matters? Journal
of Human Resources, 28(3):435{462.
Cockx, B. and Picchio, M. (2009). The Causal Impact
of Unemployment Duration on Job Quality. Available at:
http://www.eale.nl/Conference2009/Programme/PapersE/add101330 G4jEMn0Fmn.pdf.
Couch, K. A. and Placzek, D. W. (2010). Earnings losses of displaced workers revisited. American
Economic Review, 100(1):572{89.
Coulson, N. E. and Fisher, L. M. (2009). Housing tenure and labor market impacts: The search goes
on. Journal of Urban Economics, 65(3):252{264.
Eliason, M. and Storrie, D. (2006). Lasting or latent scars? swedish evidence on the long-term eects
of job displacement. Journal of Labor Economics, 24(4):831{856.
Farber, H. S. (1999). Mobility and stability: The dynamics of job change in labor markets. In
Ashenfelter, O. and Card, D., editors, Handbook of Labor Economics, volume 3 of Handbook of
Labor Economics, chapter 37, pages 2439{2483. Elsevier.
Folmer, H. and van Dijk, J. (1988). Dierences in unemployment duration - a regional or personal
problem? Applied Economics, 20(9): 1233{1251.
Gangl, M. (2006). Scar eects of unemployment: An assessment of institutional complementarities.
American Sociological Review, 71(6):986{1013.
Gregory, M. and Jukes, R. (2001). Unemployment and subsequent earnings: Estimating scarring
among british men 1984-94. The Economic Journal, 111(475):F607{F625.
Halpin, B. (1997). Unied BHPS Work-life histories:Combining Multiple Sources into a User-friendly
Format. Technical Paper 14, Colchester: ESRC Research Centre on Micro-social Change, University
of Essex.
Heckman, J. J. (1979). Sample selection bias as a specication error. Econometrica, 47(1):153{61.
Hijzen, A., Upward, R., and Wright, P. W. (2010). The income losses of displaced workers. Journal
of Human Resources, 45(1).
26Houle, M. and van Audenrode, M. (1995). Job displacement, wages, and unemployment duration in
canada. Labour Economics, 2(1):77{91.
Jacobson, L. S., LaLonde, R. J., and Sullivan, D. G. (1993). Earnings losses of displaced workers.
American Economic Review, 83(4):685{709.
Kletzer, L. G. and Fairlie, R. W. (2003). The long-term costs of job displacement for young adult
workers. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 56(4):682{698.
Kunze, A. (2002). The timing of careers and human capital depreciation. IZA Discussion Papers 509,
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
Lippman, S. A. and McCall, J. J. (1976). Job search in a dynamic economy. Journal of Economic
Theory, 12(3):365{390.
Mar e (2006). Constructing consistent work-life histories: A guide for users of the british household
panel survey. ISER working papers 2006-39, Institute for Social and Economic Research.
Neal, D. (1995). Industry-specic human capital: Evidence from displaced workers. Journal of Labor
Economics, 13(4):653{77.
NOMIS (1998). Travel To Work Areas. Available at: https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/query/showmeta.asp?metaID=85.
Oce for National Statistics (2008). TA beginners guide to the UK geography: Travel-to-Work Areas
(TTWAs). Available at: http://www.statistics.gov.uk/geography/ttwa.asp.
Paull, G. (2002). Biases in the reporting of labour market dynamics. IFS Working Paper Number
W02/10. Available at: http://www.ifs.org.uk/wps/wp0210.pdf.
Ruhm, C. J. (1991). Are workers permanently scarred by job displacements? American Economic
Review, 81(1):319{24.
Shapiro, C. and Stiglitz, J. E. (1984). Equilibrium unemployment as a worker discipline device. The
American Economic Review, 74(3):433{444.
Stevens, A. H. (1997). Persistent eects of job displacement: The importance of multiple job losses.
Journal of Labor Economics, 15(1):165{88.
Stewart, M. B. (2007). The interrelated dynamics of unemployment and low-wage employment. Jour-
nal of Applied Econometrics, 22(3):511{531.
Upward, R. (1999). Constructing data on unemployment spells
from the PSID and the BHPS. Tech. Appendix., Available at:
http://viking.nottingham.ac.uk/shared/shared levpublications/Research Papers/1999/99 7 appendix.pdf.
van Dijk, J. and Folmer, H. (1999). Wage eects of unemployment duration and frequency. Journal
of Regional Science, 39(2):319{337.
27Appendix
8.1 Data Descriptives
Table 9: Male sub-sample by previous labour market status.
1991-1997. 1991-2001.
PREV STAT: EMP. UNEMP. OLF EMP. NON-EMP. OLF
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Personal Characteristics
Age < 25 0.07 0.13 0.24 0.05 0.10 0.18
Age 25 - 29 0.12 0.15 0.17 0.11 0.14 0.15
Age 30 - 34 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16
Age 35 - 39 0.16 0.15 0.12 0.16 0.16 0.14
Age 40 - 44 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.15 0.14 0.11
Age > 45 0.35 0.28 0.22 0.37 0.32 0.26
White 0.97 0.98 0.95 0.97 0.98 0.96
Married 0.79 0.70 0.63 0.80 0.72 0.67
Spouse Employed 0.61 0.52 0.47 0.62 0.54 0.50
Children 0.38 0.36 0.37 0.39 0.37 0.39
Health limits type of work 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.06
Disabled 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02
School Type Attended
Grammar School 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.16
Private School 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06
Technical 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.05
Highest Qualication
Degree 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.18
Other Higher 0.29 0.20 0.25 0.32 0.23 0.29
A'Levels 0.12 0.17 0.18 0.12 0.17 0.17
O'Levels 0.18 0.20 0.23 0.17 0.17 0.22
Other Qualications 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.03
Apprenticeship 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01
Housing Tenure
Owned 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.13
Mortgage 0.73 0.65 0.71 0.73 0.65 0.72
Council tenant 0.05 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.10 0.06
Housing Association 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02
Workplace Characteristics
Public Sector 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03
Public Services 0.19 0.22 0.23 0.19 0.22 0.24
Charity 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02
Other Sector 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02
Missing 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Workplace Size
50 - 99 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.12
100 - 199 0.13 0.12 0.09 0.13 0.12 0.10
> 200 0.37 0.36 0.40 0.37 0.36 0.40
Workplace Union Presence 0.57 0.51 0.60 0.56 0.49 0.60
Union Member 0.41 0.31 0.43 0.39 0.30 0.43
Contract
Current job is part-time 0.01 0.07 0.06 0.01 0.07 0.06
Current temp. 0.04 0.13 0.07 0.04 0.13 0.07
Occupation
Skilled Non-Manual 0.30 0.29 0.27 0.29 0.28 0.27
Unskilled Manual 0.14 0.23 0.11 0.14 0.25 0.11
Non-manual 0.25 0.27 0.30 0.25 0.27 0.31
Professional/ Managerial 0.29 0.18 0.27 0.29 0.17 0.26
Industry
Energy & Water Supplies 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.05
Extraction of Metals, etc. Manufac-
ture of Metals
0.05 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.05
Metal goods, engineering & Vehi-
cles
0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
Other Manufacturing 0.13 0.16 0.07 0.12 0.16 0.07
Construction 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05
Distribution, Hotels & Catering,
Repairs
0.12 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.12 0.15
Transport & Communications 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.07
Banking, Finance, etc. 0.12 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.12
Other Services 0.21 0.25 0.23 0.21 0.26 0.25
Income
De
ated Real Wage] 9.62 7.98 9.02 10.72 8.96 10.10
Usual hours worked 39.82 37.78 37.73 39.89 37.82 37.80
Usual paid overtime hours 3.37 2.89 2.69 3.17 2.90 2.61
Cumulative Employment Experi-
ence (months)
265 223 198 276 240 216
Current Spell Length (months) 108 72 173 111 81 185
Total 4917 1437 1312 7109 2076 1741
]: Assumes overtime is paid at 1.5 times normal rate. Full labour market history since leaving full-time education
used to construct indicators. Specications 1 to 6 are from the sample used in the Wage analysis which excludes the
problematic regions: Redcar & Cleveland; East Riding of Yorkshire; North East Lincolnshire; North Somerset; South
Gloucestershire; Swindon; Medway Towns; West Berkshire; Conway; Debighshire; Flintshire; Bridgend; Caerphilly;
Aberdeenshire; West Dunbartonshire; East Ayrshire; East Dunbartonshire; North Ayrshire; North Lanarkshire;
South Lanarkshire.
288.2 Selection Equations




Age 25 - 29 0.140**
Age 30 - 34 0.071**
Age 35 - 39 0.144**
Age 40 - 44 0.061





Children And Married/Cohabiting 0.091
Disabled -0.269**
Health Limits Type Of Work -0.178**
School Type Attended (ref. Comprehensive, other)
Grammar School (no fee) 0.010
Private School -0.003
Technical -0.016

















1991 Economically Active TTWA Unemployment Rate -1.851**

















* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (TTWA98 Cluster Robust Standard Errors)
Marginal Eects evaluated at the sample means of the explanatory variable in question.
2(12) tests joint signicance of 12 identifying variables (exclusion restrictions).
Excludes individuals ever in self-employment at interview date plus missing real wage
observations (reducing count from 2140 to 2029.)
LL int - Likelihood ratio of intercept only model.
298.3 Alternative Threshold Denition:  Median.
Table 11: Employment Spells: Labour Market Tightnessy.
Previous Labour Market Status (ref. Employment).
Model A Model B







Reason for leaving prev. job
2. Redundancyx -7.9%* -7.5%** -7.9%* -7.5%**
Prev. Labour Market Status X Prev. Redundancyx (ref. Employment).
Unemployment Age 1991 - 1997 1991 - 2001 1991 - 1997 1991 - 2001
Tight ALL 9.9% 8.2% 10.0% 8.6%
 45 -7.4% -9.7%* -7.6% -9.6%*
Slack ALL 16.7%** 12.9%* 16.8%** 13.0%**
 45 -3.7% -5.5% -3.8% -5.5%
Inactivity
Tight ALL -5.9% 6.1% -5.3% 8.8%
 45 0.1% 7.7% -0.3% 2.7%
Slack ALL -13.7% -2.4% -12.2% 0.8%
 45 38.3%** 18.2% 36.5%** 16.2%
Model B: Prev. Unemployment X Tenure (years) on Current Job x.
3. Unemp [0,1) [1,2) [2,3) [4,1)
1991 - 1997
Tight -1.7% -9.2%* -12.1%** ! -12.2%**
Slack -12.6%** -16.7%** -15.0%** ! -16.1%**
1991 - 2001
Tight -6.2% -9.3%** -10.2%** ! -11.3%**
Slack -11.6%** -16.3%** -12.2%** ! -15.7%**
Interpretation: On average there is a higher penalty for unemployment spells experienced in tight labour markets, once reason for leaving previous
job is controlled for (panel 1). 1991-1997: Redundancy followed by unemployment carries a 1.7% penalty & 0.1% wage gain if experienced in tight
and slack labour markets respectively. This increases to a long-run penalty of 12.2% for the former case, and a .7% wage gain for the latter. No
signicant age variation is found, over and above the average eect. 1991-2001: Redundancy followed by unemployment carries a 6.2% & 9.6%
wage penalty for under and over 45s respectively, if experienced in tight labour markets. This increases to a long-run penalty of 11.3% and 20.9%
for under and over 45s respectively. In slack labour markets, the same scenario implies a 1.4% wage gain in the rst year of tenure, decreasing to
a 2.7% long-run penalty relative to a job-to-job transition.
y Tight labour market - Vacancies/Unemployment ratio > Median. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
x Relative to quits to better job, temporary contract ended, other reasons & individuals who never experienced a displacement (rst job spells).
Holding missing reasons for leaving previous job constant in all specications. Sample selection: Individuals never in self-employment at
interview date. Full set of control variables: age dummies, time dummies, a dummy for men whose current job if the rst since leaving full time
education, labour market experience dummies, marital status, health disability, temp/xed-term contract, part-time job, employment sector, rm
size, received training in current job, job type, regional dummies and industry dummies/ Correction for selectivity interacted with time dummies
also included.
NB. Previous inactivity * time dummy interactions mostly insignicant. Full results available from author on request.
8.4 Continuous Work-life histories
Figure 2 illustrates the structure of the British Household Panel Survey. In addition to the basic
structure, retrospective job and employment status information, covering the period since rst leaving
full-time education, is collected at Waves 2 & 3. There is a developing literature on the systematic
construction of continuous work-life histories, including Halpin (1997), Upward (1999), Paull (2002) &
Mar e (2006). Mar e (2006) provides an extensive review of these studies, highlighting the benets and
limitations of each approach. Given that a direct measure of experience was desired and given the lack
of a satisfactory data source, steps were taken to develop continuous work-life histories independently.
A systematic, rules-based approach was adopted in order to minimise highlighted issues in the literature
as well as to aid replication. A companion paper, Ball (2010) documents and justies the steps taken.
30Table 12: Employment Spells: High Unemployment/Low Unemploymenty.
Previous Labour Market Status (ref. Employment).
Model A Model B
1. 1991 - 1997 1991 - 2001 1991 - 1997 1991 - 2001
Unemployment
High U -10.8%** -10.6%**
Low U -10.9%** -11.2%**
Inactivity
High U -2.5% -5.3%
Low U -4.8% -6.6%
Reason for leaving prev. job
2. Redundancyx -7.7%* -7.3%** -7.7%* -7.3%**
Prev. Labour Market Status X Prev. Redundancyx (ref. Employment).
Unemployment Age 1991 - 1997 1991 - 2001 1991 - 1997 1991 - 2001
High U ALL 13.4%** 10.2%** 12.8%* 10.1%*
 45 -5.2% -7.7% -5.3% -7.7%
Low U ALL 12.7%* 11.4%* 12.5%* 11.4%*
 45 -5.4% -8.2% -5.5% -8.2%
Inactivity
High U ALL -14.9% -1.5% -16.7% -0.0%
 45 -12.4% 7.9% -8.5% 9.4%
Low U ALL 1.5% -4.9% -2.0% 2.9%
 45 16.8% 13.4% -19.3% 14.6%
Model B: Prev. Unemployment X Tenure (years) on Current Job x.
3. Unemp [0,1) [1,2) [2,3) [4,1)
1991 - 1997
High U -7.9%* -11.9%** -8.6% ! -15.2%**
Low U -7.0% -13.1%** -18.6%** ! -13.6%**
1991 - 2001
High U -9.6%** -12.4%** -7.7%* ! -13.1%**
Low U -8.2%* -12.9%** -15.1%** ! -13.6%**
Interpretation: On average there is some weak evidence (0.1%-0.6%) in support of the van Dijk and Folmer (1999) hypothesis, once reason
for leaving previous job is controlled for (panel 1). In terms of redundancies, this evidence is more mixed. 1991-1997: Redundancy followed by
unemployment carries a long-run 2.4% and 1.1% wage penalty if experienced in high and low unemployment regions respectively. 1991-2001: For
the 1991-2001 period, these gures are 3% and 2.2% after 4 years in high and low unemployment regions respectively. No signicant age variation
is found, over and above the average eect of being made redundant and then experiencing unemployment when the median threshold is employed.
y High Unemployment labour market - ILO unemployment rate > Median. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
x Relative to quits to better job, temporary contract ended, other reasons & individuals who never experienced a displacement (rst job spells).
Holding missing reasons for leaving previous job constant in all specications. Sample selection: Individuals never in self-employment at
interview date. Full set of control variables: age dummies, time dummies, a dummy for men whose current job if the rst since leaving full time
education, labour market experience dummies, marital status, health disability, temp/xed-term contract, part-time job, employment sector, rm
size, received training in current job, job type, regional dummies and industry dummies/ Correction for selectivity interacted with time dummies
also included.
NB. Previous inactivity * time dummy interactions mostly insignicant. Full results available from author on request.



















1993m10 JOBHIST 1994m12 JOBHIST
Job history (JOBHIST) le is a retrospective data source, covering the last 12 months (since the
rst of September of the previous year). Individual response (INDRESP) le is a snapshot of labour
market activity at interview date. JOBHIST data only collected if labour market status changed in
the last 12 months. For an alternative illustration of the overlap (Halpin, 1997, see Figure 1).
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r
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u
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c
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u
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c
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u
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i
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P
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p
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p
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p
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l
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R
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u
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